

Analyzing Side-Channel Leakage of RFID-Suitable Lightweight ECC Hardware

Erich.Wenger@iaik.tugraz.at

Thomas.Korak@iaik.tugraz.at

Mario.Kirschbaum@iaik.tugraz.at

Outline


- RFID?
- ECC Hardware (DUT)
- Power Analysis Attacks
 - Difference-of-Means
 - Correlation Attack
 - Revealing Intermediates
- Conclusion

What is RFID?



What are the requirements?

- Analog interface
- Data transmission protocol
 - ISO14443A
 - ISO15693
 - NFC
- Top-level application
 - Authentication
 - Privacy
 - Cryptographic primitives




Elliptic Curve Cryptography

- Why?
 - e.g. for privacy preserving protocols
- Standardized (SECG, NIST)
 - For best interoperability
 - Already used for TLS, IPsec, and SSH
- Implemented elliptic curve
 - sect163r1 (NIST B-163)

Algorithms

- Left-to-right Montgomery Ladder by López and Dahab
- Randomized Projective Coordinates
- Use the Private Scalar only Once


Architecture




Measurement Setup

- ASIC
 - Placed and Routed Design
 - VCD-based Toggle Count
- FPGA
 - SASEBO
 - Resolution Based on Input Buffer of Oscilloscope
 - Exact Clock Source Required


Measurement Methodology



Assuring Side-Channel Resistance




Assuring Side-Channel Resistance




Finite Field Multiplier

LSB First Multiplier




MSB First Multiplier




Leakage of Digit-Serial Multiplier


Simulated Traces



FPGA Traces



Correlation of Consecutive Rounds






Correlation of Consecutive Rounds

$hd(k_{161}, k_{160})=0$

$hd(k_{160}, k_{159})=1$




$hd(k_{159}, k_{158})=1$



$hd(k_{158}, k_{157})=0$

$hd(k_{157}, k_{156})=0$

$hd(k_{156}, k_{155})=1$



Correlation of Consecutive Rounds

Algorithm 1 López and Dahab round operations with key bits (0-0-1).

Ensure: $P'_1 \leftarrow P_1 + P_2$.

Ensure: $P'_2 \leftarrow 2 \cdot P_2$.

Point Addition

$$1: X_1 \leftarrow X_1 \cdot Z_2$$

$$2: Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 \cdot X_2$$

$$3: T_1 \leftarrow X_1 \cdot Z_1$$

$$4: Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 + X_1$$

$$5: Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 \cdot Z_1$$

$$6: X_1 \leftarrow x \cdot Z_1$$

$$7: X_1 \leftarrow X_1 + T_1$$

Point Doubling

$$8: X_2 \leftarrow X_2 \cdot X_2$$

$$9: Z_2 \leftarrow Z_2 \cdot Z_2$$

$$10: T_1 \leftarrow Z_2 \cdot c$$

$$11: Z_2 \leftarrow Z_2 \cdot X_2$$

$$12: T_1 \leftarrow T_1 \cdot T_1$$

$$13: X_2 \leftarrow X_2 \cdot X_2$$

$$14: X_2 \leftarrow X_2 + T_1$$

Ensure: $P'_1 \leftarrow P_1 + P_2$.

Ensure: $P'_2 \leftarrow 2 \cdot P_2$.

Point Addition

$$1: X_1 \leftarrow X_1 \cdot Z_2$$

$$2: Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 \cdot X_2$$

$$3: T_1 \leftarrow X_1 \cdot Z_1$$

$$4: Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 + X_1$$

$$5: Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 \cdot Z_1$$

$$6: X_1 \leftarrow x \cdot Z_1$$

$$7: X_1 \leftarrow X_1 + T_1$$

Point Doubling

$$8: X_2 \leftarrow X_2 \cdot X_2$$

$$9: Z_2 \leftarrow Z_2 \cdot Z_2$$

$$10: T_1 \leftarrow Z_2 \cdot c$$

$$11: Z_2 \leftarrow Z_2 \cdot X_2$$

$$12: T_1 \leftarrow T_1 \cdot T_1$$

$$13: X_2 \leftarrow X_2 \cdot X_2$$

$$14: X_2 \leftarrow X_2 + T_1$$

Ensure: $P'_2 \leftarrow P_2 + P_1$.

Ensure: $P'_1 \leftarrow 2 \cdot P_1$.

Point Addition

$$1: X_2 \leftarrow X_2 \cdot Z_1$$

$$2: Z_2 \leftarrow Z_2 \cdot X_1$$

$$3: T_1 \leftarrow X_2 \cdot Z_2$$

$$4: Z_2 \leftarrow Z_2 + X_2$$

$$5: Z_2 \leftarrow Z_2 \cdot Z_2$$

$$6: X_2 \leftarrow x \cdot Z_2$$

$$7: X_2 \leftarrow X_2 + T_1$$

Point Doubling

$$8: X_1 \leftarrow X_1 \cdot X_1$$

$$9: Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 \cdot Z_1$$

$$10: T_1 \leftarrow Z_1 \cdot c$$



$$11: Z_1 \leftarrow Z_1 \cdot X_1$$

$$12: T_1 \leftarrow T_1 \cdot T_1$$

$$13: X_1 \leftarrow X_1 \cdot X_1$$



$$14: X_1 \leftarrow X_1 + T_1$$

Correlation of Consecutive Rounds




Revealing Intermediate Operands

MSB First Multiplier




Revealing Intermediate Operands


d=1 no glitches




d=2 no glitches



d=1 with glitches



d=2 with glitches



	0	1	2	3
0	0	1	1	2
1	1	0	2	1
2	1	2	0	1
3	2	1	1	0

Revealing Intermediate Operands

$$N_{solutions} = 2^d \cdot \left(\prod_{h=0}^d \#(hd = h)^{p(hd=h)} \right)^{\lceil \frac{N}{d} \rceil - 1}$$

Parameter	N = 163	N = 256
$d = 1$	$2^1 = 2^1$	$2^1 = 2^1$
$d = 2$	$2^2 2^{0.5 \times 81} = 2^{42.5}$	$2^2 2^{0.5 \times 127} = 2^{65.5}$
$d = 3$	$2^3 3^{0.75 \times 54} = 2^{67.2}$	$2^3 3^{0.75 \times 85} = 2^{104}$
$d = 4$	$2^4 4^{0.5 \times 40} 6^{0.375 \times 40} = 2^{82.8}$	$2^4 4^{0.5 \times 63} 6^{0.375 \times 63} = 2^{128.1}$

Revealing Intermediate Operands

- Correlate with an Arithmetic Combination of Intermediates $F = f(OpB^1, OpB^2, \dots)$
- Attack Several Intermediates Simultaneously $F = f(OpB^1, OpB^2, \dots)$
- Find the x-Coordinate
$$x_i = X_r \cdot Z_r^{-1} = (\lambda X_i) \cdot (\lambda Z_i)^{-1} = X \cdot Z^{-1}$$
- Undo the Projective Coordinate Randomization $X_r = X \cdot \lambda$

Conclusion

- Investigated RFID-suitable ECC Hardware with
 - Montgomery Ladder
 - Randomized Projective Coordinates
 - Ephemeral Scalars
- Several Practical Attack Scenarios were Investigated
- **We do not recommend to use a bit-serial multiplier ($d=1$) for security-critical applications!**

Thank you...