Marisa Jimenez

Marisa Jimenez  Director PPSC EWG EPCglobal Inc. Marisa Jimenez is responsible for Public Policy matters in Europe at EPCglobal and leads its Public Policy Steering Committee European Working Group (PPSC EWG).

Marisa qualified as a lawyer at the University of Zaragoza and later specialised in EU law at the Europa Institute of Saarbruken, Germany. Marisa has 9 years of public policy experience in Brussels. She woked for the EU Commisssion at the beginning of her career and before joining EPCglobal, she held various positions at Time Warner and Deutsche Post World Net Brussels Corporate public policy offices, dealing with a variety of public policy matters ranging from consumer issues (advertising and data protection among others) as well as transport and RFID policy related issues. Marisa joined EPCglobal in March 2006 as Public Policy Director Europe, based in Brussels.

Marisa will present the key elements of the emerging policy landscape on Privacy and Data Protection in Europe and how it relates to the adoption of RFID.

Hermann Seuschek

Hermann Seuschek studied electrical engineering and information technology at Technical University of Munich, Germany. He received his Dipl.-Ing. (equivalent to Master) degree in 2005. Currently he works as an engineer with the cryptography group at the information security department of Siemens Corporate Technology in Munich. He is responsible for the department's side channel evaluation lab. His research interests include security for RFID tags, side channel analysis, and security for wireless sensor networks.

Holger Bock

A Milestone Towards RIFD Products Offering Asymmetric Authentication Based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography:
After years of discussion whether asymmetric cryptography would be feasible for RFID tags or not, we present a major breakthrough towards RFID products incorporating asymmetric authentication. For the challenge-response protocol applied the response is calculated by performing an elliptic curve point multiplication using a random number based challenge and the tag's secret key. The design is resistant against side channel attacks such as timing, simple power, differential power, and fault attacks. Some side channel countermeasures depend on random numbers which are provided by a synthesizable true random number generator. The ISO 15693/18000-3 Mode 1 compliant RFID tag we present is based on a concept developed by Siemens Corporate Technology published earlier this year. It incorporates Infineon's energy efficient 163 bit ECC engine with single clock cycle addition and 41 clock cycles 4 bit parallel multiplication for the field operands. The energy spent during the ECC calculation is less than our target of 10 µJ and the overall area of the tag's silicon is smaller than 0.8 mm² in a 220 nm RFID technology. For early verification and host software development we designed an FPGA-based emulation and test setup including an RF front end. At this time first samples of our ECC RFID chip are being manufactured.

Nai-Wei Lo

Nai-Wei Lo received his B.S. degree in engineering science from the National Cheng-Kung University , Tainan , Taiwan , in 1988, and the M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in computer science and electrical engineering from the State University of New York at Stony Brook , New York , in 1992 and 1998, respectively. From 1998 to 2000, he worked as a software consultant at AT&T Network Services Division in Middletown , New Jersey , and was responsible for the system architecture design of web based integrated business solution systems. In 2000, he joined Lucent Technologies as a technical staff member in ONG group to develop intelligent network management applications for world-wide Telecom companies. In 2003, he returned to Taiwan and joined the National Taiwan University of Science and Technology (NTUST). He is currently an assistant professor in Department of Information Management, a research member in TaiWan Information Security Center (TWISC), a research member of RFID resources center in NTUST and a member of the IEEE communications society. His research interests include RFID applications and security, wireless network routing and security, Web technology, and fault tolerance.

RFID Authentication: Design and Challenge:
RFID authentication is the necessary function for novel RFID application systems to combat potential security threats and comply with certain system-specific identification requirements. Since the hardware resource, system requirement, and system environment are different for a RFID system in various existing application scenarios and future perspectives of new applications, it is a practical and interesting challenge to design RFID authentication protocols that properly fit into different application environments and provide security stronghold for the target RFID systems at the same time. In this presentation, I will introduce identified security threats to RFID system, the possible countermeasure mechanisms to malicious attacks, authentication design consideration, and challenges to overcome in the future.

Thomas Eisenbarth

Thomas Eisenbarth is a Ph.D. candidate at the Department of Electrical
Engineering at Ruhr University Bochum. He works  as a research assistant
with the embedded security group of the Horst Goertz Institute for
IT-Security.  His research interests include efficient implementation of cryptographic algorithms, and physical security. Thomas Eisenbarth studied electrical engineering and computer science at Ruhr-Universitaet Bochum and Technical University of Navarra. Contact him at eisenbarth@crypto.rub.de .

Open Sesame! How Secure are RFID Access Control Systems?
Remote keyless entry systems are widely used for access control purposes
such as car anti-theft systems or garage door openers. The probably most popular system for many applications relies on the KeeLoq algorithm.
A new attack that combine side-channel cryptanalysis with specific properties of the KeeLoq algorithm will be presented. The attack allows for efficiently revealing both the secret key of a remote transmitter and the manufacturer key stored in a receiver. Once knowing the manufacturer key a remote control can be replicated from a distance, just by eavesdropping at most two messages. This key-cloning without physical access to the device has serious real-world security implications and shows that physical attacks need to be considered when designing security for RFID systems.